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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Before us is a Petition for Review filed by Duquesne Light 
Company, a Pennsylvania investor-owned electric utility in 
the Greater Pittsburgh area ("Duquesne"), of afinal rule of 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") 
approving, pursuant to section 110 of the Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. S 7410, a revision to the New Source Review of the 
State Implementation Plan of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. We have jurisdiction to review suchfinal 
agency actions pursuant to section 307(b) of the Clean Air 
Act, 42 U.S.C. S 7607(b). 
 
EPA argues first that Duquesne lacks both constitutional 
and prudential standing. This is an issue that we must 
address at the outset. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012-13 (1998). However, to 
understand EPA's contention that Duquesne cannot meet 
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the causation and redressability requirements for standing, 
it is necessary to understand the statutory framework. 
 
Under the Clean Air Act, EPA has the obligation to 
establish national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") 
for certain pollutants. Because the Act establishes a joint 
federal and state program to control air pollution and to 
protect public health, the states are required to prepare 
implementation plans, or SIPs, for each designated"air 
quality control region" within their borders. 42 U.S.C. 
S 7410. The SIP must specify emission limitations and other 
measures necessary for that region to meet and maintain 
the required NAAQS. Id. S 7410(a)(2)(A)-(K). Each SIP must 
be submitted to EPA for its review and approval. The Act 
requires a public notice and comment period, and the SIP 
must be approved if it is found to meet the minimum 
requirements of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. S 7410(k)(3); 
see also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976). 
The Clean Air Act expressly provides that the states may 
adopt more stringent air pollution control measures than 
the Act requires with or without EPA approval. See 42 
U.S.C. S 7410(k)(3). 
 
In 1990, the Clean Air Act was amended to address the 
failure of some states to meet their required NAAQS. 
Pursuant to the 1990 Amendments, all SIPS must contain 
a New Source Review program, which establishes 
procedures for state regulation of proposed new sources of 
pollutants. Id. S 7410(a)(2)(C). Further, New Source Review 
programs for what the EPA characterizes as 
"nonattainment" regions must require that the entities 
seeking to construct new major sources of regulated 
pollutants, or to make significant modifications to such 
existing sources, must obtain a preconstruction permit 
obligating them to obtain "sufficient offsetting emissions 
reductions" so as to represent "reasonable further progress 
towards attainment." Id. S 7503(a)(1)(A). 
 
EPA has promulgated regulations regarding minimum 
criteria for EPA approval of New Source Review SIPs for 
nonattainment areas which contain a number of definitions 
which must be used by the states for this purpose. 
However, the EPA regulations also provide that a state may 
deviate from those definitions "only if the state specifically 
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demonstrates that the submitted [state] definition is more 
stringent, or at least as stringent, in all respects as the 
corresponding [federal] definition . . . ." 40 C.F.R. 
S 51.165(a)(1). 
 
Duquesne has a non-operational electric generating 
station currently in cold- reserve status which it hopes to 
use to generate Emission Reduction Credits ("ERCs"). ERCs 
are recognized by the regulatory agencies as reductions in 
pollutants. ERCs are determined as the difference between 
(1) emissions after an entity's action (e.g., shut ting down or 
modernizing polluting equipment) and (2) a baselin e of 
prior "actual emissions." Although ERCs are initially 
assigned to the entity responsible for the reduction, they 
may be bought and sold. Apparently, it is Duquesne's 
interest in preserving ERCs from its dormant plant that is 
the basis for its challenge to the SIP revision. 
 
The SIP revision to which Duquesne objects relates to the 
definition of "actual emissions," which, as noted, form the 
baseline for the determination of ERCs. EPA regulations 
define "actual emissions" as generally equaling the average 
rate at which the source "actually emitted the pollutant 
during a two-year period which precedes the particular date 
and which is representative of normal source operation." 40 
C.F.R. S 51.165(a)(1)(xii)(B). They further provide that "[t]he 
reviewing authority shall allow the use of a different time 
period upon a determination that it is more representative 
of normal source operation." Id. 
 
The Pennsylvania New Source Review program at issue, 
adopted in January 1994, effects what Duquesne terms a 
de facto definition of the term "actual emissions," and what 
EPA prefers to refer to as "Pennsylvania's definition." In any 
event, Pennsylvania provides that "actual emissions or 
allowable emissions, whichever is lower, shall be calculated 
over the 2 calendar years immediately preceding the 
emissions reduction which generates the ERCs," 25 Pa. 
Code S 127.207(4)(i)(A), thus mirroring the federal scheme. 
Pennsylvania further provides, however, that should the 
reviewing agency determine that the period immediately 
preceding is "not representative of the normal emission 
rates or characteristics of the existing facility," it may 
specify a different, more representative, 2-year period 
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occurring within the preceding 5 calendar years. Id. 
S 127.207(4)(i)(B). Unlike the federal definition, this 
definition limits the "look-back" period. 
 
In February 1994, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection ("PDEP") submitted the New 
Source Review regulations to EPA as revisions to the 
Pennsylvania SIP. EPA's notice of proposed rulemaking to 
grant limited approval was published in May 1997. During 
the public comment period, Duquesne complained that 
what it described as Pennsylvania's "de facto" definition of 
actual emissions was more stringent than the federal 
definition. It also complained that (1) contrary  to its own 
regulations, EPA had not required Pennsylvania to 
demonstrate the definition's stringency, and (2)  the 
Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act prohibited PDEP 
from promulgating a more stringent Clean Air Act-related 
rule. EPA responded that applicable federal regulations 
permit more stringent state requirements and that, because 
the Pennsylvania Environmental Quality Board expressly 
found the New Source Review rules necessary to achieve or 
maintain NAAQS, state law authorized the adoption of rules 
more stringent than the federal minimum.1  Duquesne 
alleges in its Petition for Review that (1) EPA ac ted 
arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law in approving 
Pennsylvania's definition of "actual emissions" without 
requiring a demonstration of stringency, and (2)  EPA 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act in failing to 
respond reasonably to Duquesne's comments regarding the 
Pennsylvania definition. 
 
With this background before us, we turn to consider 
Duquesne's standing. The constitutional standing inquiry 
requires a three-fold showing: the party asserting 
jurisdiction must demonstrate (1) an "injury in  fact," 
(2) that the injury is "fairly traceable" to  the action or 
actions complained of, and (3) that the injury wil l likely be 
redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Duquesne has filed a request for administrative reconsideration of 
EPA's final approval of the revised SIP. This request, which is pending, 
does not affect the finality of the action for purposes of judicial 
review. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 7607(b). 
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There is no serious question with respect to Duquesne's 
injury-in-fact. Duquesne has come to court complaining 
that it will lose ERCs as a result of the EPAs approval of the 
PDEP's action. These ERCs are of tangible value to 
Duquesne; they would permit Duquesne to operate less 
expensively, and they are even fungible. Hence, Duquesne 
has met the first requirement for standing, inasmuch as 
the loss of valuable credits constitutes an imminent 
concrete injury. 
 
Duquesne's claim to jurisdiction, however, founders on 
the other two prongs of the standing test: causation and 
redressability. The causation requirement is only satisfied 
where the injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action 
of the defendant, and not the result of the independent 
action of some third party not before the court." Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997). In this case, Duquesne's 
injury is manifestly the product of the independent action 
of a third party -- Pennsylvania's Department of 
Environmental Protection. It is PDEP's action -- redefining 
the SIP in such a way that Duquesne may not receive ERCs 
for its dormant plant -- that results in the reduction of 
credits below the level that Duquesne urges would be the 
result if the Pennsylvania definition did not go beyond the 
minimum level of stringency required by federal law. 
 
However, the EPA, whose action in approving the plan 
forms the asserted basis for federal jurisdiction here, only 
has power to disallow state plans that fail to be stringent 
enough -- that is, plans that fall below the level of 
stringency provided by federal law. See 42 U.S.C. S 7416 
("[N]othing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right 
of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or 
enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions 
of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respectin g control 
or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission 
standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable 
implementation plan . . . such State or political subdivision 
may not adopt or enforce any emission standard or 
limitation which is less stringent than the standard or 
limitation under such plan or section."). EPA thus has no 
power to require Pennsylvania to make its plan the same as 
the federal requirement, provided Pennsylvania's is more 
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stringent than required by the Clean Air Act; rather, EPA by 
statutory directive must approve a plan when it conforms to 
the federal minimum. See 42 U.S.C. S 7410(k)(3) ("[T]he 
Administrator shall approve such submittal as a whole if it 
meets all of the applicable requirements of this chapter."). 
Therefore, the EPA's action in approving the plan is not 
"fairly traceable" to the injury of which Duquesne 
complains. 
 
For similar reasons, Duquesne's claim against the EPA 
fails the redressability requirement. To be "redressable" for 
standing purposes, it must "be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision." Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1163. It is Duquesne's 
hope that it can have this action set aside by the EPA on 
the ground that its stringency -- required to be at or above 
the level mandated by federal law -- was not sufficiently 
addressed by the EPA. But again, as the foregoing 
demonstrates, EPA may not require less stringency-- 
which is the outcome Duquesne hopes to achieve -- in its 
review of whether the definition is adequately stringent. 
And, it should be added, Duquesne does not argue that the 
PDEP's definition is insufficiently stringent; in fact, 
Duquesne stated in its comments on the EPA's proposed 
approval of the Pennsylvania New Source Review SIP that, 
"PA DEP's approach is, in effect, more stringent than EPA's 
definitions." App. at 718. 
 
Consequently, Duquesne cannot through this action 
secure an order from EPA or this court requiring PDEP to 
make its requirements more lax. Rather, what Duquesne 
seeks is to compel EPA to engage in a formalistic exercise 
by conducting a fuller demonstration of the stringency of 
PDEP's definition. Such a "demonstration" would be a 
technical formality as the stringency of that definition is not 
only apparent on the face of the definition, but also 
conceded by Duquesne. At best, if Duquesne were 
successful in this court, it would get a second opportunity 
to convince PDEP that its definition is too strict, an exercise 
that is wholly inconsistent with the asserted ground for 
maintaining that the regulation was improperly approved 
by EPA. Such a speculative contingency cannot support 
Article III standing. 
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Accordingly, we will dismiss this Petition for Review for 
lack of standing. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                8 
 
